

Chase, 1968

Research Institute

Ben Tran, Kim Cuong (H.N.), Long An?

- "Opposition" group in Lower House;
 - will put out magazine
 - organize in provinces
 - in Saigon, economists, lawyers, ...

Research + Study Center

Representatives in House will represent Center in their home provinces (or a group of provinces), carry on local research.

- e. g. 1) What to do with refugees: 2) during war
6) after war

Study refugees in home area — background, aspirations
(check on info from Min Social Welfare);

Synthesize these at national level;

(Are the areas they want to return to still
cultivable? Can their methods of ag be improved?
What training, equipment, investment required?

[What will cities look like after war?

How many go back?

- Can offer to let all House members use research

talked with Jim

Vann/Komer

Vogel/Thorn/Koe/Thompson/Ky

1. Meld unity among Thim, K, Doe — US must do
much.

[or crush one]

Unacceptable to have division.

(after 1)

2. Enlarge the representation of the people in the
Gov — to include at least $\frac{2}{3}$ of people in our
zone, instead of (at most) $\frac{1}{3}$.

3. Thm, address problems of war + peace.

Already, may occur the US of fostering divided
gov, so as to monopolize power

(Axiom: It couldn't be happening if US didn't want).

2)
Whether or not Thm/one is ^{Cabinet,} gov, get agreement from
them to support gov, contribute, influence; (b) peace
with Buddhists.

Subjects

- elections
- Research Institute
- pacification
- democratic system in VN
- Power structure in VN
- China war
- Image of US policy: (CORDS, MACV, Embassy, Wash)

Ky-Thin bitterness:

- Thin can't get rid of Loan

- Khang, Vin, Tri threatened to resign if Loan dropped

- Maybe Thin made commitment to Ky + Bunker

(at luncheon?)

Loan organizing a Ky group in Hanoi (not

Thin group: he does not do what Ky does

(indifference)

Warty to Thin

Loan

- At least make Buddhists neutral; not, as now, opposed. Use Catholic leaders to make first approaches, as intermediaries.

(Senate & House both ~~too~~ much based on religion)

6 tickets of 48 for Senate elected

est.

System new to people: 50% of people voted by chance;

50%

others influenced selectively mainly by religion,

Don got a) Budd support

b) Budd support

c) Opp. to Shin/Ky (i.e. by military).

4 Cath tickets: Nguyen, —

last was Dai Viet (Ha Thue Ky)

that ships moved...

Lower House:

larger

In Dia Dinh: 30% by chance, 70% by selection; in other provinces, 90% selective.

(Too many candidates in Dia Dinh; people apathetic).

In Quang Tri (Chau's wife's uncle 1st) Cath & Boudo worked together to elect one Cath & one Boudo.

In Hue, man elected with support of Tri Quang Boudo. Dr. Ng. Dai Bang.

T.Q. had > 20 elected to House; supported Dia/Dinh in Senate.

K & US want to ~~abolish~~ Tam Cham powerful
among Buddas.

e.g. Gov has given draft exemption to religious III
"ministers" — but only through hierarchy. At present,
Gov recognizes only Tam Cham — yet those only

What will you

Kim Hoa

19 candidates; Chan had support of all religions. 2 members:

Buddhist order	Chan + 1	
Cao Dai	Chan + 1	(son of founder of Cao Dai in Kim Hoa)
Cath	only Chan	
Hoa Hao	only Chan	
Account Ten group (met)	only Chan	

38,000 votes, 42% of votes 93,000 votes

2d man got 11,000 : 12% (Head of medical services, doctor; not religious support).

- Highest proportion (except for Montagnards) different

4 others had higher props, but fewer rivals

(Kim Tsoy: ^{80%} only 1 candidate)

Hue: 44%

- Different between 1st & 2d

Assembly:

Pay: 45,000 - 5000 tax + 60,000

(plans pay 28,000 for personal cost 15000
(rep. in Kim)
+ 7 pres and 1 asst. rep.

Needs 1 man sec at 7000 to handle

complaints: - 2 months received 140 letters
from people in province. "They don't understand
exactly what my function are; e.g. they have a son
beaten by a soldier." (Personal rep. gets in touch
with unit commander; gets explanation (16 year-old
got into personal dispute with NCO; but soldier
did beat ^{often} very badly. Pers. rep. investigated,

[Group could analyze mail, survey grievances

Follow with Habib to Japan: "Very depressed... sick... to
think a man of this stature could be Polit. Councillor in
Beijing... so ignorant, stupid — entirely optimistic..."

Burden on Kim Hoo: see how people take to ^{our} P.C.

But people horrified...

Han Nghia: US action, VC leave; US retreats, VC return.

If US-NVN invasion, war becomes wholly US vs NVN;
this would unify VNese, N+S, and non-Com with VC
vs. US. 3 mill. US troops — to do what 1 mill
now doing in S.

On Carnegie:

1. First point: "I have believed for years: should emphasize protecting people, not destroying Coms"

[Now, a counsel of "second-best,"
assoc. with

2. ~~Be~~ Systematic bombing of NVN

a) Fortifies leaders

b) Confirms people, as anti-US and anti-SVNese

c) In SVN: support by leaders of bombing makes
them look like puppets

d) in general, people in SVN — except NVNese Caths —
think

- and they all have relatives in NVN

- role of ~~as~~ merchants in VC system
- 1st Div (support of autonomy, Main reserves:
by Kim & Westy of ~~Thang~~ Thang). (good for contig bodies.
incident: 3 kms).
- Hoops of Huong & Lue
- Support of ARVN/RF/PF dependents
- Scheme on promotion: by classes, acquaintances
- ranking of Divs (count on Thich, Chai's uple
- if may for 1 removed US div used for RVNAF support, effort 10 times the
(e.g. if PF provided intell of VC ground movements...)
(RVNAF as machine not switched on...)

(Thai on ratio of casualties as Div continues)
f


Plan Charts

(In what is now called "pacified" area, we do almost ~~nothing~~ nothing to pacify further; yet (2) much VC activity even in this area, even more in surrounding area;


3) How must keep much mil. & police strength in A" area, to protect it (give insecurity of B area).

Need a program that will permit mil. forces to be moved out to operate mainly in C area: i.e. that will raise security greatly in A area, make B area a security belt around A (while preparing it to become A).

Now:



Should be:



Most important failure in our pac. program has been the failure to coordinate activities in all different types of areas: pacified, under pacification, contested, uncontrolled.

The objection and demonstration ^{of success} of pac is that village in "pacified" area:

1) is run ^{only} by an elected village gov.

2) with people participating in PSDF

and 3) gov force represented in village only by police.

Even (1) without (2), village gov, as in fact, might do nothing (or go over to VC).

PSDF must be different from Combat Youth (street bands), which are, paid, uniformed "militia" and separated from the people.

L Binh Dinh: 2 ARVN regiments (~8000)

ROK Div (20,000)

2 US Brigades (~10,000)

RF/PF 12,000

RD cadre 800

CIDG ~1000

Police ?

~52,000

$\sim \frac{1}{3}$ of populated area

Tung Phouc district pacified; parts of other
largest ~~that~~ area taken back from VC: troop density
and Bi's RD program

(Parts of An Giang and Chau Doc

Section: In two areas, we saturated with troops: Binh
Dinh and Quang Nam. In B.D. there was something else
(not only RD program,

cont.

(Macklin: Hank Stockpole, Marine PIO

Chart 13 Within village to be pacified

Emphasis on sequence of functions, activities, goals:

1) Build confidence (prerequisite: confidence in themselves, by gov representatives, and in what they are doing. ~~Eg~~).

E.g. the support and feeding of cadre and gov reps must be organized in advance; don't just quarter cadres and dependants on the public).

X X

Scotton: on Ben Luc, refugees:

If only 3-4000 to move in a province, OK. If
tens of thousands, (as in B.D.) don't: you can't give
them a better life. (On Ben Luc: been tried
twice before: Sumner, ¹⁹⁶² ~~1962~~ ⁴⁹ 63; Airborne Brig. 1965).

leaving creates problem for VC, but not insurmountable
: can grow food.

Op should not aim at creating refugees.

Operating base in VC area should aim at
attracting young men out of the VC; create
some model conditions.

[Whose idea was it to move Ben Luc villagers?
Why?]

[Claw: Should never have called us "advisors";
French used better term, "liaison," even when former
French bn commander stayed on with ~~these~~ VC unit.]

Chen
[Thang said, at Hanoi LBJ told Thang, "I rely
on two American civilians in VN: Lodge & Sandale."
Thang took seriously. Also, T thinks EGL may
outlast other US, by political power in Wash
and past experience. And, has good relationship
with EGL — in part, because C is not "advisor" —
he can say "yes" or "no" to E & L ideas without
losing face.]

Vann: 1. Westy "ship": always referred to
"military gov" of province. Counting on Wilson
proposal, to have in other provs a man reporting
to Vann on civil side, Seaman on mil. side, Westy
said, "Of course, we must really have a satisfactory
chain of command till Vann reports to Seaman."
Then, realizing Vann was still present (behind him)
he recovered, said, "Of course, I guess it's a bit
premature to say that."

See ^{ARPA} ~~ARPA~~ report on MACV takeover.